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This paper examines Tokyo’s engagement with Somali piracy and discusses what it 
reveals about Japan’s overall security posture. I argue that Japan’s response to Soma-
li piracy highlights the continued salience of domestic political processes and em-
bedded anti-militarist norms in moulding Tokyo’s responses to emergent threats, of 
which piracy is a prime example. This is evidenced by the fact that the Japan Coast 
Guard (JCG), rather than the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), is 
primarily responsible for Japan’s anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Addition-
ally, I draw attention to the economic logic underpinning Japan’s approach to securi-
ty and posit that the defence of sea lanes links maritime security issues to continued 
economic security to explain why combatting maritime piracy is important to Tokyo.      
Debating Japanese security, international pressures versus domestic norms  
Japan’s post-war constitution was introduced by the United States (US)-led Occupa-
tion government in 1946, roughly a year after Japan’s defeat in the Second World 
War by the US and its allies and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A 
key element of the new constitution was Article 9, the “peace clause,” which re-
nounced war as a tool of foreign policy and dispute settlement and forbade Japan 
from maintaining a military (Article 9, Japan Constitution; Hughes, 2004: 21). Japan 
became firmly embedded in the US-led capitalist camp during the Cold War and bi-
lateral norms informed by its alliance with Washington dominated Tokyo’s external 
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relations during this period. In terms of security policy, the Yoshida Doctrine be-
came the dominant approach. The Yoshida Doctrine was the brainchild of then 
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and it emphasised security dependence on the US, 
institutionalised via the Japan-US security alliance in 1960, and a prioritisation of 
post-war economic recovery and growth (Hook et al., 2012: 84-85; Yamaguchi, 
2012: 81). In return for the US protection, Japan had to host a network of US mili-
tary bases, notably in Okinawa which would remain under US administration until 
1972, in order to help Washington project its power into Asia (Hughes, 2004: 22). 
Japan did have to take on some responsibility for its security, especially its internal 
security. Labour activism was perceived to be a particularly important threat owing 
to concerns about the advance of communism in East Asia. These fears came to the 
fore during the Korean War (Yamaguchi, 2012: 83). The National Police Reserve 
(NPR) was formed in 1950. This was quickly followed by the formation of the Na-
tional Safety Force (NSF) in 1952 and the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) and 
Japan Defence Agency (JDA) in 1954. The SDF and JDA remain Japan’s primary 
externally-focussed security institutions (Hughes, 2004: 22).      
In terms of domestic society, the experience of war, as represented by the atomic 
bombings, combined with the post-war constitution led to the entrenchment of anti-
militarist norms at the societal level. Opposition parties played, and continue to play, 
an important role in safeguarding anti-militarist norms (Hook et al., 2012: 85; 
Delamotte, 2012: 160-162). Additionally, polling data consistently shows that most 
Japanese citizens oppose constitutional revisions aimed at scrapping or altering Arti-
cle 9. Recent changes in the interpretation of the constitution and the new legislation 
which allows for collective self-defence by the current Abe administration resulted 
in protests, including at least one example in which a man self-immolated (Japan 
Times, 2014; BBC, 2014). Indeed, as Midford (2011) argues, Japanese public opin-
ion against drastic security policy reforms and constitutional revisionism has re-
mained remarkably consistent for decades. 
Despite the continued salience of domestic and international constraints on its securi-
ty policy, Japan has cautiously and incrementally expanded its international security 
profile since the end of the Cold War, albeit within normative and constitutional con-
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straints. For example, the SDF is engaged in various peace-keeping operations and 
humanitarian assistance missions (Midford, 2011: 108; Aoi, 2012: 132-133; 
Delamotte, 2012: 160-162). The evolution of Japanese post-Cold War security pos-
ture has attracted considerable academic and policy-making interest. One of the key 
points of contention is the degree to which domestic variables, like pacifist norms, 
and international variables, like the rise of China, determine Japanese security poli-
cies (Hughes, 2014: 373). Neorealism posits that anarchy is the ordering principle of 
the international system and that states are beholden to no higher authority. Conse-
quently, states must pursue power in order to secure themselves and their material 
interests. Inevitably this leads to conflict with other states, which are doing the same 
thing (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). As noted by Hughes (2014: 373), neorealist 
interpretations of Japanese security policy can be divided into two camps: offensive 
realists and defensive realists. Both camps assume that the major influences on Japa-
nese security policy arise from Japan’s external environment. The former position 
argues that structural changes in the international system, specifically the relative 
decline of the US and the need to balance a rising China, Japan’s regional rival, will 
force Tokyo to adopt an assertive military posture to match its economic standing. 
Japan will, offensive realists argue, inevitably “normalise” its security policy and 
military outlook to balance China (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1993; Hughes, 2004).  
Contrastingly, defensive realists argue that structural changes will induce milder 
security policy reforms in Japan. The relative decline of the US is not so great that 
Washington will abandon East Asia altogether. As such, the US-Japan alliance will 
balance a rising China and Japan will make modest reforms to its current defensive 
posture, striking a balance between dependence on the US and emergent threats from 
China. Richard Samuels refers to this balance as the Goldilocks Approach, not too 
close but not too far from the US and getting security “just right” (Samuels, 2007, 
2006). Additionally, defensive realists predict that Japan will enhance its defensive 
capabilities whilst assuring its neighbours that it is not on a path to remilitarisation. 
Finally, Japan, defensive realists predict, will utilise its economic strength to pursue 
power via mercantilist policies (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998; Green 2001). 
Overall, neorealist interpretations highlight the explanatory power of post-Cold War 
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structural changes in studying Japan’s evolving role in an increasingly complex and 
multipolar international system. 
Constructivist scholars emphasise developments at the domestic level. They high-
light domestic societal norms and identities, specifically anti-militarism and paci-
fism, as the defining features of Japanese foreign and security policy. Norms filter 
upwards from the societal level into the policy-making process. The consequence is 
a profound resistance to Japan taking on a more aggressive military posture 
(Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993). Indeed, Friman et al. (2006: 85) have questioned 
whether or not pacifist norms are an “immovable object.” Ultimately they argue that 
as new threats emerge, the social norms evolve to accommodate them and that as the 
world becomes increasingly globalised the lines between internal and external threats 
become increasingly blurred (Friman et al., 2006: 85-86). Additionally, Katzenstein 
and Okawara (2008: 60) point out that security policy-making processes are diffused 
through multiple government ministries all with competing interests and identities. 
For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has an interest 
in securing Japanese economic interests and thereby ensure Japanese security and 
foreign policies are in line with mercantilism. The Ministry of Finance, for example, 
has an interest in balancing the national budget and this further restrains military 
advancement (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2008: 60). The overarching theme of con-
structivist analyses of Japanese security policy is that domestic forces play a key role 
in articulating Japanese security postures and that societal norms are particularly 
important. 
Linking economic and maritime security: piracy and shipping lanes 
In the decades following the Second World War, Japanese foreign policy doctrines 
and national security priorities have been underpinned by a certain economic logic. 
Indeed, Japan’s prioritisation of the economic aspects of international relations has 
led several scholars to classify its foreign policy as mercantile realism (Heginbotham 
and Samuels, 1998). This economic logic is evident in the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan’s 
first major post-war foreign policy doctrine. As mentioned earlier, the Yoshida Doc-
trine emphasised dependency on the US in security matters and a prioritisation of 
58 
 
© Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University 
All Rights Reserved. 
Issue 4 
December 2016 AFRICAN 
EAST-ASIAN 
AFFAIRS 
THE CHINA MONITOR 
post-war economic recovery (Hook et al., 2012: 29; Yamaguchi, 2012: 81). Tokyo 
derived many significant economic benefits by becoming enmeshed in the US sphere 
of influence and capitalist camp during the Cold War. First, with US security guaran-
tees being institutionalised in the 1960 ratification of the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo’s 
defence expenditure remained low and has hovered around one per cent of the na-
tional budget for the past few decades (Akaha, 1991: 326). Even more significantly, 
Tokyo’s partnership with Washington ensured that Japanese manufacturers had ac-
cess to the US market (Hughes, 2004: 22). Washington also backed Japanese ascen-
sion to emerging international economic institutions. For example, Japan joined both 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), the precursor to the modern World Trade Organisation (WTO), in 
1952 and 1955 respectively (Hook et al., 2012: 343-344). It is evident that, in the 
early years of the Cold War, economic recovery was a priority and this fact is re-
flected in the Yoshida Doctrine. 
Economic considerations continued to play a key role in shaping Japanese foreign 
and security doctrines in the latter half of the Cold War and into the post-Cold War 
period. This is observable in the concept of comprehensive national security. The 
concept of comprehensive national security gained popularity in Japan in the late 
1970s and early 1980s and remains an important pillar of Japanese security policy 
today. The term was popularised by a 1978 joint report by the National Institute for 
the Advancement of Research (NIRA) and the Nomura Research Institute (Akaha, 
1991: 324; Bradford, 2004: 484-485). Conceptually, comprehensive security builds 
on framework developed under the Yoshida Doctrine with its minimal focus on mili-
tary affairs and prioritisation of economic development. However, US commitments 
to Asia following the defeat in Vietnam and the 1973-74 OPEC oil crisis forced Ja-
pan to reassess its security posture (Chapman et al., 1983; Akaha, 1991: 325-326). 
The 1973 oil crisis struck a nerve because it highlighted Japan’s dependency on im-
ported Middle Eastern oil and general lack of domestic resources (Yoshimatsu, 
2014: 578). The Japanese economy was based on value-added production which 
depended on imported raw materials and the exportation of finished goods. This 
made the potential for disruptions to Japan’s supply lines especially concerning for 
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policy-makers (Graham, 2006: 10; Chapman et al., 1983: 232). Comprehensive na-
tional security developed as a recognition of Japan’s economic vulnerability and the 
changing security environment in the latter half of the Cold War. Japanese policy-
makers, therefore, adopted a multifaceted approach to national security comprised of 
military and non-military dimensions. On the military front, Prime Minister Nak-
asone abandoned the policy limiting defence expenditure to less than one percent of 
Gross National Product (GNP) in 1985 and Tokyo became more receptive to US 
demands for more equitable defence burden-sharing. In non-military front, Japan 
made large financial contributions to various United Nations (UN) missions and sub-
stantially increased its humanitarian aid and official development assistance (ODA) 
programs (Akaha, 1991: 237-239). Domestically, Japan’s technological and econom-
ic capabilities became vital to the maintenance of national security and policymakers 
came to regard economic decline as a major threat (Yoshimatsu, 2014: 578; Samuels, 
2007: 143-144). Japan’s concept of comprehensive national security, like the Yo-
shida Doctrine, highlights the importance of economic considerations in Japanese 
approaches to security. 
Geography plays an important role in linking maritime security developments to 
Japanese concerns about economic security. East Asia is a maritime region and 
threats emanating from the sea play particularly important role in the regional securi-
ty agenda. Indeed, according to Paik (2005: 15), most of the major security threats in 
East and Southeast Asia emanate from maritime concerns. These could include tradi-
tional security threats such as territorial disputes or naval build ups. Alternatively, 
they could be non-traditional security threats such as conflicts over fishing, oceanic 
pollution, natural disasters or maritime piracy (Paik, 2005: 15; Liss, 2013: 141; 
Wirth, 2012: 223). Asian waters are particularly significant because they sit at the 
centre of international trade and shipping routes (Baird, 2012: 501). Trade flowing 
through Asian waters is both interregional and intraregional and played an integral 
role in promoting the economic growth of both Northeast and Southeast Asia (Baird, 
2012: 502-503). According to Allessio Patalano, East Asia is a maritime system and 
historically the sea “constituted the region’s main connecting fabric with shipping 
routes providing the highways for trade, transport and the projection of power across 
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its most remote corners” (Patalano, 2012: 222). For East Asia, regional maritime 
security issues are especially important given the high degree of economic interde-
pendence and connectivity.  
Japan is an island nation, or more accurately an archipelagic nation, in an intercon-
nected maritime system (Patalano, 2012: 222). This has profound implications for 
Japanese economic security and explains why contemporary maritime piracy can be 
viewed as a threat to national security. Fundamentally, piracy is an economic crime 
which has the potential to upset the flow of raw materials to Japan and finished prod-
ucts out of Japan. Japan has a complicated relationship with the sea. It is a source of 
both security and vulnerability. For centuries, insular geography kept the world at 
bay, creating a spatial and cognitive differentiation between Japan and the Asian 
mainland (Yamaguchi, 2012). Kamikaze winds and tempestuous seas helped prevent 
the Mongol invasions centuries ago, for example. The sea is also an important source 
of food security. However, with the onset of modern transport and trade networks 
coupled with Japanese industrialisation and economic development, the seas became 
a source of vulnerability. In fact, Euan Graham (2006) characterises the protection of 
sea lines of communication (SLOCS) a matter of “life and death” for Japanese eco-
nomic health and therefore national security. Concerns over maritime trade have 
historically informed developments in Japanese security posture. For example, Pata-
lano (2008) demonstrates that the JMSDF fielded a sizable submarine force to keep 
an eye on Soviet maritime activities Northeast Asian waters and safeguard sea lanes. 
Additionally, in 1981 Japanese policy-makers decided to extend JMSDF patrols to 
1,000 nautical miles in response to US demands for increased security burden-
sharing (Samuels, 2007: 89). In fact, Samuels (2007: 144) highlights the fact that 
current Sino-Japanese territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have pro-
found implications for Japanese sea lane security. The protection of maritime trade 
networks is important to Japan and as those networks extend beyond the East Asian 
region and into the Indian Ocean region, for example, Japanese maritime security 
interests must follow (Kotani, 2011). Threats to sea lane security can emanate from 
traditional sources, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during 
the Cold War or China’s rise. Alternatively, they can come from non-traditional 
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sources, like piracy. For example, Graham (2006: 25-31) and Black (2014: 117) note 
that piracy-induced trade blockages, in the Malacca Straits or Gulf of Aden, have the 
potential to seriously undermine Japan’s economic health. If such a blockage were to 
occur, ships en route to Japan would have to be rerouted, costing roughly US$ 
200,000 to US$ 300,000 per ship (Black, 2014: 117). Acts of piracy also have a 
more indirect cost. Ships occasionally have to hire private security or install other 
security measures, like location device ShipLoc or Secure Ship, a kind of electric 
fence. These added costs produce a more expensive but secure shipping industry. 
However, the need for more secure shipping is detrimental to the Japanese consumer 
because the price of goods goes up (Black, 2014: 2). This is on top of the safety risks 
posed by maritime piracy to Japanese citizens who work in the shipping industry 
(Bradford, 2004: 486). Therefore, the issue of piracy speaks to Japanese concerns 
over the nation’s economic well-being and highlights Japan’s dependency on mari-
time trade.   
Whatever floats your boat: JMSDF vs JCG 
Japan has two primary maritime security organisations. The first is the JMSDF and 
the second is the JCG. The latter organisation has taken on an increasing number of 
maritime threats since the end of the Cold War, such as incursions by North Korean 
“suspicious ships” and anti-piracy cooperation with Southeast Asian and East Afri-
can states (Black, 2014: 2). Importantly, for this paper, the JCG is the Japan’s prima-
ry anti-piracy organisation. While the JMSDF patrols the Gulf of Aden and escorts 
ships through troubled waters, officials from the JCG have to be on-board and they 
are the people with the authority to board suspicious vessels and make arrests 
(MOFA, 2009, 2016). Additionally, the JCG is involved in a variety of capacity 
building initiatives with littoral states in both Southeast Asia, another piracy hotspot, 
and the Gulf of Aden (MOFA, 2006, 2016). The increasingly important role of the 
JCG in meeting maritime threats has led some analysts to speculate that Tokyo uses 
it to test the waters, so to speak, for the eventual “normalisation” of the JMSDF’s 
international security role. David Leheny (2006: 165) invokes the “canary in a coal 
mine” metaphor to describe this idea. Richard Samuels (2008: 97-98) argues that the 
JCG has become a second navy and fulfils the same function as a regular military. 
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Consequently, the JCG’s role in combatting various maritime security issues is seen 
as an erosion of Japanese pacifist norms. 
Lindsay Black, however, argues that conflating the JMSDF and JCG is misguided 
(Black, 2014: 4). Both organisations serve different functions and are governed by 
very different legislations. For example, the JCG is a civilian law enforcement, dis-
aster relief and emergency response organisation housed within Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT). Contrastingly, the JMSDF is 
housed within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its mission is to defend Japan’s 
territorial integrity (Black, 2014: 4). Historically, the JCG evolved out of the Mari-
time Safety Agency (MSA). The MSA was created to combat organised crime in 
Japanese coastal waters and the fact that the fundamental purpose of the JCG is law 
enforcement alleviates East and Southeast Asian concerns over Japanese remilitari-
sation and makes them more amenable to working alongside and learning from the 
JCG (Black, 2014: 4; Sato, 2007: 3; Bateman, 2006: 50-51). The prominence of the 
JCG in responding to maritime threats demonstrates the importance of domestic anti-
militarist norms and regional concerns regarding Japan’s military posture in shaping 
Tokyo’s response to piracy and other emergent maritime threats (Black, 2014: 5). 
Norms, therefore, have an important role to play in determining what range of policy 
options are available to Japan. 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa 
Attacks by pirate gangs off the coast of Somalia increased rapidly in the early 2000s. 
The most common kind of attack is kidnapping for ransom. Pirates will board ships 
and hold the crew hostage. Then, they will extort large sums from shipping compa-
nies in exchange for the safe return of the crew and the cargo (Kraska and Wilson, 
2009: 223; Beckman and Davenport, 2014: 145). Piracy in this region has a signifi-
cant impact on international shipping because of its proximity to the Suez Canal. The 
attacks have been noted for their boldness and violence. A total of 42 vessels were 
captured by pirates in 2008. This jumped up to 114 attacks in the first five months of 
2009 (Kraska and Wilson, 2009: 223). Political instability and economic deprivation 
in Somalia are the primary drivers behind the rapid growth in regional maritime 
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crime. The overthrow of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of Sharia courts 
that governed most of Somalia after the collapse of Said Barre’s regime in 1991, by 
joint Ethiopian and Somali transitional government forces was a particularly im-
portant development. There is a significant correlation between the fall of the ICU 
and the dramatic increase in piratical attacks (Pham, 2010: 329-330; Chalk, 2010: 90
-94). Governmental collapse is also evident in the way Somali pirates defined them-
selves. Pirates would often refer to their actions as collecting a “fishing tax” and that 
they were taking it upon themselves to police illegal fishing in lieu of the govern-
ment’s ability to do so (Kraska and Wilson, 2009: 224-225). The UN Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) was quick to respond to piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa. It 
issued resolutions 1816 and 1846 calling on all nations to work together to combat 
piracy and secured the permission to the Somali transitional government to allow 
foreign vessels to conduct anti-piracy missions in Somalia’s territorial waters 
(UNSC, 2008). Shortly after, the UNSC also called on states engaged in anti-piracy 
missions to cooperate with states willing to charge and prosecute pirates, such as 
Kenya (Gathii, 2010: 416). Japan would become one of those states in 2009 with the 
passage of its own anti-piracy law. Under Japan’s anti-piracy law, four Somali na-
tionals were prosecuted for their involvement in the attempted hijacking of the MV 
Guanabara in 2011 (Hayashi, 2010: 143; MOFA, 2016). Combined Task Force 151 
(CTF-151), a multilateral anti-piracy force comprised of 31 states, was established as 
a consequence of the multiple UNSC resolutions. The European Union (EU) also 
dispatched its EU Naval Force (Chalk, 2010: 97-99). Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and 
around the Horn of Africa resulted from a mixture of government collapse and eco-
nomic deprivation within Somalia. The international reaction to it was swift and en-
couraged a variety of multilateral military initiatives to contain the threat to interna-
tional trade.   
Japan’s contributions to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia  
Japan has initiated reforms to its own legal code to combat maritime piracy, actively 
contributes to UN missions in the region and made financial contributions to aid lo-
cal coast guards, of which Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen are prominent beneficiaries 
(MOFA, 2016). Japan enacted an anti-piracy law in 2009 which allows the MSDF to 
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protect both Japanese and foreign-owned ships from pirate attacks and escort them 
through dangerous waters. Japan has also enacted legal reforms which allow private-
ly-owned Japanese ships to hire armed security capable of shooting pirates in the 
event of an attack. Since 2009, two MSDF vessels have been deployed to the Gulf of 
Aden to combat maritime piracy and aboard each is a contingent of JCG officials 
equipped with the necessary authority to arrest pirates. Indeed, four Somali nationals 
were charged and convicted under Japanese law for the attempted hijacking of the 
MV Guanabara in waters near Oman in 2011 (Japan Times, 2011; MOFA, 2016). In 
addition to the two MSDF ships, Japan has deployed two P-3C maritime patrol air-
craft. Between June 2009 and June 2015, the two planes conducted over 1,000 pa-
trols. In order to support maritime and air patrols and escort missions, Japan con-
structed a military base in Djibouti in 2011 with the support of the Djibouti govern-
ment (MOFA, 2016; 2009). Japan has participated in the UN-mandated Combined 
Task Force 151 (CTF-151) zone-defence activities in addition to the MSDF’s own 
escort missions. Additionally, CTF-151 was under Japanese command for a three-
month period in 2015. Japan also participates in multilateral dialogues associated 
with its membership in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(MOFA, 2016). The Contact Group was established following the passage of UN 
Resolution 1851, an anti-piracy resolution (MOFA, 2016; UN, 2008). In addition to 
its own efforts and UN-initiated ones, Japan works to enhance the coast guard capa-
bilities of regional states, notably Djibouti, Yemen and Somalia, via training exercis-
es, technical assistance and providing patrol boats. It also contributes financially to 
anti-piracy initiatives via the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Djibouti 
Code Trust Fund, a Japan-initiated fund aimed at capacity-building programs in So-
malia and neighbouring states. Additionally, Japan provides funds to the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre on an ad-hoc basis. The purpose of 
these funds is to promote dialogue between Southeast Asian and East African states 
regarding their experiences of maritime piracy (MOFA, 2016).         
Japan and Somali piracy – domestic factors defining Japanese engagement 
The Japan Ship Owners Association (JSA) played an important role in drawing gov-
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ernment attention to the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It did this by lobbying 
the Japanese government to tackle piracy in after the number of attacks in that region 
increased in 2008. The 2008 attack on the Takayama and subsequent JSA lobbying 
was a particularly important catalyst for Japanese government involvement in the 
issue. Initially, the JSA contacted Iwazaki Teiji, an official at the Ministry of Land 
Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) (Black, 2012: 268-269; 2014: 136). MLIT is the 
Japanese government ministry which oversees the JCG. Mr Iwazaki confirmed that 
the JCG was unable to tackle piracy around Somalia because it lacked the operation-
al capacity to do so. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese government set up several ODA 
initiatives in the Gulf of Aden and brought the Draft Law on the Penalisation of Acts 
of Piracy before the Diet, Japan’s parliament, in 2009. The law included a role of the 
JMSDF in anti-piracy operations. The Diet debate following this submission limited 
the role of the JMSDF and ensured that the primary responsibility for combatting 
piracy lay with the JCG. For example, only JCG officials are allowed to board sus-
pected pirate vessels and have the authority to arrest suspected pirates (MOFA, 2009, 
2016; Christofferson, 2009: 140; Black, 2012: 272, 2014: 135-136).  
Japan’s counter-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Aden were the result of a discursive 
process between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-Komeito alliance and multiple 
Japanese opposition parties, most notably the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The 
various Japanese opposition parties were determined to uphold the anti-militarist 
norms embedded in Japan’s constitution and undermine the ruling LDP’s political 
standing. The LDP government under Aso Taro was very unpopular and the opposi-
tion parties controlled the Upper House of the Diet. Consequently, opposition parties 
were determined to challenge the government on any new legislation as the contin-
ued failure to pass new laws would force a snap election (Japan Times, 2009a; 
Black, 2012: 269). Challenging the constitutionality of dispatching the JMSDF to 
combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden provided an opportunity to do so. With this in 
mind, government policy-makers had to craft anti-piracy measures in such a way that 
opposition parties would be unable to fault their constitutionality. Therefore, the 
government highlighted the fact that piracy is a criminal issue rather than a military 
issue. Consequently, the JMSDF was there to support the JCG in its law enforcement 
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duties, not the other way around. Additionally, the JMSDF was limited to escort and 
surveillance duties whereas the JCG would be the organisation invested with the 
authority to actually arrest pirates and board their boats (Japan Times, 2009b; Chris-
tofferson, 2009: 140; Black, 2012: 272; 2014: 135-136). The government also ar-
gued that all dispatching Japanese officials would complement rather than replace 
capacity building initiatives amongst regional states like Djibouti and Yemen and 
ODA-led approaches (Black, 2012: 276). Overall, the debate around the constitution-
ality of dispatching Japanese officials to combat maritime piracy highlights the fact 
that anti-militarist norms play an important role in shaping the content of Japanese 
security policies. 
Conclusion 
This paper examined Japan’s efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. It has 
argued that Tokyo’s response to piracy demonstrates the continued importance of 
domestic anti-militarist norms in moulding Japan’s response to piracy. Opposition 
parties were eager to challenge the constitutionality of the planned JMSDF dispatch 
and consequently the LDP-led government developed a policy in which the JCG, a 
civilian law-enforcement body, played the primary role. Additionally, this paper 
posited that maritime threats, like piracy, are particularly important for Japanese 
policy-makers because of the potential disruptions of shipping lanes have profound 
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